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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-3742 
___________ 
 
JACKSON NJAGA NGARUIYA, 
        Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
        Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A058-030-954) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Walter A. Durling 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 20, 2015 
 
Before: FISHER, KRAUSE and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: February 20, 2015) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Petitioner Jackson Njaga Ngaruiya petitions for review of the final order of 
removal of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA” or “Board”) dismissing his appeal 
from a removal order entered by an Immigration Judge (“IJ”).  For the reasons discussed 
below, we will deny the petition for review.   
 Petitioner, a native and citizen of Kenya, entered the United States in 2006 as a 
lawful permanent resident.  In 2011, he was convicted of: (1) indecent assault of a person 
less than sixteen years old, in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3126(a)(8); and (2) 
indecent assault without consent, in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3126(a)(1).  
Thereafter, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) charged Petitioner as removable 
for having been convicted of an aggravated felony (namely, the sexual abuse of a minor), 
see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) (providing that the 
“sexual abuse of a minor” qualifies as an “aggravated felony”).1  The DHS also charged 
Petitioner with removability for having been convicted of a crime involving moral 
turpitude, see 8 U.S.C.  § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i).  At an administrative hearing, Petitioner 
argued before the IJ that he had not been convicted of an aggravated felony and thus 
should not be ordered removed on that basis.  He did not contest the moral turpitude 
charge.   
                                              
1 In Restrepo v. Att’y Gen., 617 F.3d 787, 796 (3d Cir. 2010), we concluded that 18 
U.S.C. § 3509(a) was an appropriate guidepost for the definition of “sexual abuse of a 
minor.”  That section defines “sexual abuse” to include “the . . . use . . . of a child to 
engage in . . . sexually explicit conduct or the rape, molestation, prostitution, or other 
form of sexual exploitation of children . . . .”  18 U.S.C. § 3509(a)(8). 
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 In March 2014, the IJ ruled that Petitioner’s conviction for indecent assault of a 
person less than sixteen years old qualified as sexual abuse of a minor and, therefore, as 
an aggravated felony.  He then ordered that Petitioner be removed to Kenya.  In an 
August 2014 order, the BIA dismissed Petitioner’s administrative appeal, upholding the 
IJ’s determination that Petitioner’s conviction under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3126(a)(8)2 
qualifies categorically as molestation or sexual exploitation of a child under 18 U.S.C.  
§ 3509(a)(8) and, by extension, sexual abuse of a minor under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A).  
The Board determined that Petitioner’s arguments to the contrary had been foreclosed by 
our recent decision in Cadapan v. Attorney General of the United States, 749 F.3d 157, 
161 (3d Cir. 2014).  This petition for review followed. 
 Our jurisdiction is circumscribed because Petitioner is removable for having been 
convicted of an aggravated felony.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C).  However, we can 
consider the jurisdictional prerequisite whether the alien’s conviction constitutes an 
aggravated felony, and we can also hear “constitutional claims and questions of law” (but 
not factual challenges) even if presented by an alien convicted of an aggravated felony.  
                                              
2 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3126(a)(8) provides: “A person is guilty of indecent assault if the 
person has indecent contact with the complainant, causes the complainant to have 
indecent contact with the person or intentionally causes the complainant to come into 
contact with seminal fluid, urine or feces for the purpose of arousing sexual desire in the 
person or the complainant and the complainant is less than 16 years of age and the person 
is four or more years older than the complainant and the complainant and the person are 
not married to each other.”  Indecent contact is defined as “[a]ny touching of the sexual 
or other intimate parts of the person for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual 
desire, in any person.”  18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3101. 
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Restrepo, 617 F.3d at 790.  As he did before the Board, Petitioner argues here that his 
Pennsylvania indecent assault conviction does not qualify as an aggravated felony under 
the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”).3  We agree with the BIA that his 
arguments in support of that contention are foreclosed by our decision in Cadapan. 
 In Cadapan, we determined that a conviction of indecent assault under 18 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 3126(a)(7)4 is subject to the “categorical approach” of analysis.5  749 F.3d 
at 159.  We further determined that the Pennsylvania statute categorically constitutes the 
aggravated felony of “sexual abuse of a minor” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) because 
all of the conduct criminalized by the statute meets the definition of “sexual abuse” in 18 
U.S.C. § 3509(a)(8), which the BIA reasonably uses as a reference point for interpreting 
“sexual abuse of a minor” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A).  Id. at 160-61.  In so holding, 
we rejected one of the arguments that Petitioner raises on appeal—that because 18 Pa. 
                                              
3 In his brief, Petitioner asserts that he was convicted under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 3126(a)(7).  However, the record of conviction demonstrates that he was, in fact, 
convicted under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3126(a)(8).   
 
4 The only difference between § 3126(a)(7) and § 3126(a)(8) (under which Petitioner was 
convicted) is that the former criminalizes indecent assault against minors under thirteen-
years-old, and the latter criminalizes the same behavior against minors under sixteen-
years-old (when the perpetrator is four or more years older and not married to the minor).  
The provisions are otherwise the same. 
 
5 The categorical approach precludes review of the factual basis for the underlying 
conviction.  See Singh v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 144, 147-48 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Taylor 
v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600-02 (1990).  Instead, we consider whether the least 
culpable conduct necessary to sustain a conviction under the statute satisfies the 
definition of the applicable INA provision.  See Partyka v. Att’y Gen., 417 F.3d 408, 411 
(3d Cir. 2005). 
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Cons. Stat. § 3126 is a divisible statute, it should be analyzed under the “modified 
categorical approach” of analysis, rather than the categorical approach.6  In Cadapan, we 
concluded that that even though Pennsylvania’s indecent assault statute is divisible, it 
should not be analyzed under the modified categorical approach because “all of the 
conduct covered by the statute constitutes sexual abuse of a minor.”  Id. at 161 n. 4 
(citing United States v. Jones, 740 F.3d 127, 134 (3d. Cr. 2014) as holding that the 
modified categorical approach is only appropriate where a divisible state statute 
proscribes some conduct that falls under umbrella of federal statute and some that does 
not).  Petitioner has not provided us with any reason to disturb that ruling.  
 Petitioner also argues that the Board erred in determining that his indecent assault 
conviction constituted an aggravated felony because the “mere touching” of a minor 
should not qualify as sexual abuse.  However, as mentioned, in Cadapan we determined 
that that all conduct covered by Pennsylvania’s indecent assault statute categorically 
constitutes “molestation” or “sexual exploitation” of a child within the meaning of 18 
U.S.C. § 3509(a)(8) and, by extension, “sexual abuse of a minor” under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43)(A).  749 F.3d at 161.  Petitioner’s argument is therefore unavailing.    
                                                                                                                                                  
 
6 If a statute of conviction lists elements in the alternative, some of which fit the federal 
definition and some of which do not, courts apply the modified categorical approach and 
are permitted “to consult a limited class of documents . . . to determine which alternative 
formed the basis of the defendant’s prior conviction.”  Descamps v. United States, 133 S. 
Ct. 2276, 2279 (2013); see also United States v. Brown, 765 F.3d 185, 188–91 (3d Cir. 
2014) (discussing operation of the categorical and modified categorical approach in light 
of Descamps). 
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 Based on the above, the BIA correctly determined that Petitioner’s conviction for 
indecent assault qualifies as sexual abuse of a minor and thus rendered him a removable 
alien based on an aggravated felony.  We will therefore deny the petition for review. 
